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of the infamy attached to the criminal act. In considering this disqualification one may well remember the words of Professor Wig41
more:
"The legislatures of almost every jurisdiction have long ago
either entirely abolished or narrowly restricted the disqualification by conviction of crime. The statutes in the United
States when not providing for entire abolition, usually retain the common law rule for perjury only (including subornation) ; while a few retain it in its original scope as to
kinds of crime, but apply it in criminal trials only; but neither
of these limitations has any justification in logic or policy."
The disqualification is based on infirm foundations and has been
repealed for over a century in England, the land of its origin.42 The
decision by the Florida Supreme Court that a perjurer convicted in
another jurisdiction may be a witness in Florida makes clear the
unreasonableness of applying the rule solely to those convicted in
Florida. 43 In the case of a criminal defendant the rule appears to be
unconstitutional.
The Florida Supreme Court has taken the first step by narrowing
the scope of the rule, but the ends of justice would be better served
if the legislature would reconsider the law. The statute should be
repealed entirely, or it should be modified along the lines of the
current New York law, that is, use the record of conviction of perjury only to affect the credibility of the witness.
RICHARD D.

DEBOEST

TERMINATION OF NONCONFORMING USES BY
AMORTIZATION
With the wildfire expansion of Florida municipalities, the need
for efficient and effective comprehensive zoning has become a matter
of major concern to municipal authorities. The most ingenious of
should escape because of the inability of the witness to relate what he saw?
4'See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §524 (3d ed. 1940).
42Ibid.
43Lefcourt v. Streit, 91 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956).
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comprehensive zoning plans will result in nonconforming uses' that
must be eliminated if the plan is to be successful. Land utilization
that does not conform to zoning ordinances is a major obstacle to
effective zoning.2 Municipal attorneys,3 urban planners, 4 zoning authorities, 5 and law review commentators 6 agree that nonconforming
uses reduce the effectiveness of zoning ordinances, impair property
values, and contribute to the growth of urban blight.
The control and elimination of property uses through zoning
have long been considered valid exercises of the police power; however, any deprivation of property or use thereof must of course be
done within constitutional limitations. Generally, a property owner
has a vested property right in a nonconforming use; 7 consequently
zoning ordinances may not operate retroactively to deprive the owner
of this right.8 Any ordinance that takes away the right to a nonconforming use in an unreasonable manner, or that is not in the
interest of the public welfare is invalid.9 The immediate cessation
of nonconforming uses through zoning ordinances has been held to
be an unreasonable exercise of the police power.1 0 This summary
termination is unconstitutional unless the use constitutes a public
nuisance or if denial of the right to continue it would preclude the
only suitable utilization of the property."'
Zoning authorities originally assumed that property owners would
eventually eliminate nonconforming uses or that these uses
would eliminate themselves. Experience has proved this to be
'A nonconforming use "is created when an area is zoned and there is already within such area property being used in such a manner as not to conform
to the zoning regulations." State ex rel. S. A. Lynch Corp. v. Danner, 33 So.2d 45,
47 (Fla. 1947).
2See WaesTE, URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 403 (1958).
sSee MESSER, NONCONFORMING USES, MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LA-W IN ACTION
374 (1951).
4See LEwis, A NEw ZONING PLAN FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 112 (1956).
5
See YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 362 (2d ed. 1953).
6See Notes: 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 477 (1942); 102 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1953).
7Schneider v. Board of Appeals, 402 Ill. 536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949).
sSee RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 921 (1957).
oSchneider v. Board of Appeals, supra note 7; James v. City of Greenville, 227
S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955); City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254
S.W.2d 759 (1953).
1ojones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930); James v. City of
Greenville, supra note 9.
"iStandard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960 (1932)
(gasoline station).
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little more than wishful thinking, for property owners, particularly
those operating businesses in contravention of zoning ordinances,
were quick to discover that zoning was actually beneficial to nonconforming uses in that it enabled a monopoly to be effected. The
authorities soon discovered that a comprehensive zoning plan alone
is inadequate to accomplish effective control of land utilization. Indeed, positive action is essential to the elimination of nonconforming
uses. This may be accomplished by three basic methods: (1) eminent
domain proceedings, (2) utilization of nuisance law, and (3) amortization. The first two methods are effective, though limited, tools
for termination of nonconforming uses of property and will be dealt
with summarily.
Broadly defined, eminent domain is the sovereign power vested
in the state to take private property for a public use. 12 This power is
absolute except as restrained by constitutional limitations, 13 which
require that the taking be for a public purpose' 4 and with just compensation."

These requirements greatly limit the use of eminent

domain in terminating nonconforming uses, and at present only one
state grants specific statutory authority for this purpose.1 6
There is no statutory authority in Florida permitting eminent domain proceedings to be used to terminate nonconforming uses; and
to date the Florida Supreme Court has narrowly construed the public
purpose requirement when invalidating certain urban redevelopment
plans.17 In view of this strict construction it is extremely doubtful
that eminent domain could be effectively utilized in this state to end
many existing nonconforming uses. Moreover, the administrative
difficulties involved in the valuation procedure, and the costly reimbursement of property owners contribute to make any extensive
use of the device unlikely. However, in limited situations, when the
"2State ex rel. Lamar v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 27 So. 221, 41 Fla. 363
(1899).
"3Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 128 So. 402 (1930);

Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926).
14E.g., Osceola County v. Triple E Development Co., 90 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1956);
Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953); State v.
Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952); Demeter Land Co. v. Florida
Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 13.

"5Board of Pub. Instr'n v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So.2d 637 (Fla.
1955); Abell v. Town of Boynton, 95 Fla. 984, 117 So. 507 (1928).
16MINN. STAT. ANN. §462.13 (1947).

-,State v. Cotney, 104 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958); Adams v. Housing Authority,
60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952); State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
18See BASS'rT, ZONINC, 27 (1936).
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circumstances are such as to satisfy the constitutional requirements
and justify the expense, the power of eminent domain may be used
as a valuable adjunct to comprehensive zoning.
If a nonconforming use within a specific locale is particularly
obnoxious to the community and other property owners, it may be
classified as a nuisance and forced out of existence immediately.19
The use of nuisance principles to terminate nonconforming uses is
somewhat limited, however, because a nonconforming use will not
necessarily be sufficiently onerous to be classified as a nuisance. Nuisance law is nevertheless important in this area; it has been relied
upon to uphold general ordinances, enacted under the police power,
requiring the immediate discontinuance of nonconforming uses that
verge on nuisance. The United States Supreme Court has upheld
ordinances directed toward the termination of stables2o and brickyards21 that were particularly obnoxious to the residential areas in
which they were located.
The termination of nonconforming uses by utilization of nuisance
law or by municipal ordinances that are upheld because the use involved verges on a nuisance sometimes works a financial hardship
on the individual property owner who is required to discontinue a
certain use of his property. This has not, however, prevented the
utilization of these methods. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian22 the property owner operated a brickyard; this was a lawful use 23 of the
property until the area in which it was located was annexed by the
City of Los Angeles. The brickyard was valued at $800,000 when
operating, but the land was worth only $60,000 for residential or
other legitimate uses. The United States Supreme Court, in upholding an ordinance requiring immediate discontinuation of the
brickyard, stated in regard to the financial hardship it worked upon
24
the property owner:
"[W]e are dealing with one of the most essential [police]
powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, in'gPerkins v. City of Coral Gables, 57 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
2Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
2lHadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
221bid.
23t is important to note the nuisance factor in this case, i.e., soot, smoke, gas,
odors, etc., coming from the brickyard. Without their presence it is extremely
doubtful that the Court would have allowed immediate termination of the use.
24239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
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deed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual,
but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest
cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. .

.

. There must be progress, and if in its march private

interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the
community."
The third, and relatively new, method of terminating nonconforming uses is by amortizing the use over a reasonable period of
time. This method does not run afoul of the general rule that a
zoning ordinance that operates retroactively is unconstitutional,25
because the use is not terminated immediately. The somewhat
specious reasoning of most courts on this point is that the owner of
the nonconforming use is given a monopolistic position for his business over the amortization period, and this is deemed to compensate
him for the ultimate removal of the business.2 6 Regardless of the
reason, state and federal courts have upheld the elimination of nonconforming

27
uses within periods of one,

two, 28 five,29 and ten

0

years as a reasonable exercise of police power that does not deprive
the owner of his property without due process of law.
In order for amortization to be valid, it must be reasonable. The
amortization ordinance must be part of a comprehensive zoning plan
that is reasonable in relation to the area zoned. In addition, the
amortization period must be reasonable in relation to the loss of use
of the property incurred by the owner. Finally, the loss incurred by
the owner must be reasonable in relation to the gain realized by
the community. The importance of this requirement is illustrated
in the following line of amortization cases.
25See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 921 (1957).

26For an excellent discussion of the monopoly argument see City of Los
Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954). See also Note, 35 VA.
L. REV. 348 (1949).
2
7State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929)
(drugstore); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929) (grocery store).
2sSpurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957) (auto
wrecking business).
29City of Los Angeles v. Gage, supra note 26 (plumbing establishment); Grant
v. Mayor & City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957) (billboards).

30Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 892 (1950) (gasoline station).
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The first two decisions were the Dema Cases,31 in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a New Orleans zoning ordinance
that required the discontinuance of all nonconforming uses in a
newly zoned residential district within a one-year period. The ordinance was peculiar in that it made all nonconforming uses statutory
nuisances; and the holding that one year was not an unreasonable
time in relation to the size and nature of the two small businesses
affected has been criticized as exhibiting confusion between zoning
and nuisance regulation. 32 This criticism is undoubtedly correct
from the theoretician's point of view; however, both businesses could
have been relocated at a relatively small loss. Hence as a practical
result the ordinance still fell within the conditions of reasonableness.
The validity of a zoning ordinance, or its application, as it affected a particular nonconforming use was involved in Livingston Rock
and Gravel Co. v. Los Angeles. 33 A cement-mixing company sought
to enjoin the county from enforcing certain provisions of a zoning
ordinance that had been enacted subsequent to the establishment of
the business. The area in question had been rezoned for light industry, and the petitioner had been given twenty years to discontinue
operation. The zoning commission had the power to revoke the
period of amortization for cause, and one year later it declared the
cement plant to be a nuisance and demanded immediate termination
of operations. The California Supreme Court upheld the commission
and denied the petitioner equitable relief. This court also upheld
another Los Angeles ordinance that required the discontinuance of
a plumbing business within five years.3 4 The court found that the
owner could move the business at a cost of $5,000 and that this expense amortized over a five-year period would not work an unreasonable hardship on the owner.3 5
State courts in Kansas,38 Maryland,37 and New York38 have also
31See cases cited note 27 supra.

32Matter of Frannor Realty Corp. v. Le Boeuf, 201 Misc. 220, 226, 104 N.Y.S.2d
247, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 735 (1930).
3343 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954).
34City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
35However, the California Supreme Court has adamantly refused to uphold
ordinances that require the overnight discontinuance of a property use without
just compensation when there is no question of public health, safety, or welfare.
See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
36Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P .2d 798 (1957).
37Grant v. Mayor & City Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
38Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
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upheld amortization ordinances; in each instance the underlying test
of reasonableness was met.
Not all amortization ordinances have been upheld. In most instances, however, it was because the amortization period was unreasonable in relation to the loss incurred by the property owner. In
Corpus Christi v. Allen- 9 an ordinance requiring the discontinuance
of junk yards within nineteen months in an area that had been rezoned for light industry was held invalid because the benefit to the
community was small in relation to the hardship caused the junk
dealer. In Town of Somers v. Camarco40 a zoning ordinance permitted continuance of the operation of a gravel pit, although it was
a nonconforming use. The ordinance was later amended to require
removal of all of the structures at the gravel pit over an approved
period. The amendment was held invalid on the basis that the
destruction of substantial buildings or structures was inequitable.
Amortization has been flatly rejected in at least one jurisdiction.
In City of Akron v. Chapman4 1 a municipal ordinance was enacted
that gave the city council discretionary power to discontinue any
nonconforming use that had been permitted to exist for a reasonable
time. Under this authority the council enacted another ordinance
describing the property in question by metes and bounds and naming
the owner, and stated that use of the property as a junk yard had
existed for a reasonable time and must be discontinued within one
year. The Ohio Supreme Court refused to uphold the ordinance on
the theory that a property right can be divested only under eminent
domain proceedings or by an exercise of the police power in the
abatement of a nuisance.
The ordinance in the Akron case was clearly discriminatory in
that it named the property owner and specifically outlined the property involved. Furthermore, it was an example of spot zoning, which,
in the absence of a real nuisance, will generally be looked upon with
disfavor by the courts.42 Either of these reasons was sufficient to invalidate the ordinance; consequently 3the court's disapproval of amortization has been severely criticized.4
To date there have been no reported cases in Florida dealing
39152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
40126 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
41160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
42RATHKOP,

THE LAW OF ZONING AND

PLANNING

§7A (2d ed. 1949). See also

Annot., 128 A.L.R. 740 (1940); 165 A.L.R. 823 (1946).
4q67 HARV. L. REv. 1283, 184 (1954).
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specifically with amortization. However, in Standard Oil Co. v. City
of Tallahassee" a federal court upheld a zoning ordinance that
amortized a gasoline station in the state capital over a ten-year period.
The Florida Supreme Court viewed this decision with approval in
Adams v. Housing Authority,45 thereby implying that a zoning ordinance that provides for discontinuance of a nonconforming use
after a reasonable period of time will be upheld in Florida.
CONCLUSION

The problem of eliminating nonconforming uses is a vexatious
one for municipal zoning authorities. Eminent domain is usually expensive, and its application is severely restricted by constitutional
limitations. The nuisance theory is also limited in application to
few factual patterns; in addition, the immediate termination of use
that results often works a financial hardship on the property owner.
Amortization is the most far reaching of the three available methods
and, it is submitted, is the most equitable for both property owner
and the community.
Amortization is certainly no panacea for all zoning problems.
Since the projection of sound zoning plans beyond a few years is
extremely difficult, amortization will be of slight value when dealing
with large capital investment property that would reasonably require
long periods of time for their termination. The success of amortization that extends beyond a few years is often speculative. However,
amortization is a very useful device when applied to nonconforming
uses that can be fairly eliminated within a short period of time. The
use of property for parking lots, junk yards, gasoline stations, and
neighborhood groceries or drugstores can usually be discontinued
within a few years without offending the rules of reasonableness.
Amortization offers a flexible method of terminating nonconforming uses - a method that can fairly balance the equities between
municipality and property owner. It is submitted that with the
urgent need for zoning controls in a rapidly developing state such
as this one, it would be desirable for Florida municipalities to utilize
amortization as the fairest and most valuable device for discontinuing
nonconforming uses.
ROBERT J. CARR
EDWARD B. DAvIs, JR.
44183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
460 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1952) (dictum).
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